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I.Consequences of Legal Autopoiesis 
 
An old wealthy bedouin sheikh wrote his will and divided his fortune, a large herd of camels, 
among his three sons. Achmed, the eldest son, was to inherit the first half of the fortune, Ali, 
the second son, should get a fourth, Benjamin, the youngest son, a sixth. When the father 
died, unfortunately only eleven camels were remaining. Achmed, of course, demanded six of 
them and was at once contested by his brothers. Finally, when everything broke down, they 
turned to the khadi. He decided: ‘I offer you one of my camels. Return it to me, Allah willing, 
as soon as possible’. Now, with 12 camels, the division was easy. Achmed got his half, 6 
camels, Ali got a fourth, 3 camels, Benjamin a sixth, 2 camels. And indeed, the twelfth camel 
was left over which they kept and fed very well and happily returned to the khadi. 
     On various occasions, Jean-Pierre Dupuy and Niklas Luhmann, in their debates on self-
organisation and autopoiesis had retold this old story in order to shed light on the internal 
paradoxes of the law, on the problematic relation of law to itself (Dupuy, 1988; Luhmann, 
200b;  for  a  general  discussion  of  legal  autopoiesis,  see  King  and  Schutz,  1994;  Baxter, 
1998).
1 In the dazzling light of the desert – at the same site, where Derrida  observes the 
violence of law’s self-foundation, where Kelsen had seen the Grundnorm, and Hart the basic 
rule of recognition -  they see the khadi’s twelfth camel grazing at a green place. But they 
quarrel whether the site is an oasis or a Fata Morgana. For them the twelfth camel is not a 
symbol representing something else, rather it performs itself the symbolic operations of law.  
It is the localized self-reference of the legal system which ends in the interplay of paralysing 
paradoxes and liberating moves.  
     I would like to continue this debate on the consequences of legal autopoiesis, but shift the 
focus from law’s internal self-reference to the external relations of law to society: What is the 
social  surplus  value  of  the  twelfth  camel?  This  raises  intricate  issues  of  mapping  social 
conflicts  in  law:  How realistic is the image  of  the judge’s camel?  At  the  same  time  the 
problematic relation between the legal decision and its grounds comes up: Does the judge’s 
camel filter produce only a smokescreen which hides something else or does it produce good 
legal arguments which determine or justify sufficiently the final decision? Finally, questions 
of justice are at stake: Is the twelfth camel a satisfying conflict resolution and/or does it 
justice to the customs and manners of the bedouin society? 
 
 
II. Conflict alienation 
 
     The  twelfth  camel  refutes  a  basic  assumption  which  unites  diverse  strands  in  the 
sociological critique of law, from Ehrlich and the realist school, via normative thinkers like 
Hayek and Habermas to recent entrepreneurs in deconstruction. What they have in common is 
to criticize law’s estrangement  from its social and human origins, its violent abstraction from  
the relation between ego and alter, and to ask for law’s return to what they see as its roots: 
social  norms,  spontaneous  rules,  community  standards,  discursive  rationality,  or deconstructive justice. Most drastic is Christie’s formula of law as expropriation of conflict 
(Christie, 1977). Law is systematically unable to understand social conflicts and to resolve 
them  adequately.  The  reason  is  that  law’s  formalising  violence  via  legal  procedures  and 
conceptualisations  expropriates  conflicts  from  their  proper  context  of  social  and  moral 
understandings of the parties. The new formula is: Expropriate the expropriators! Give the 
conflict back to the people! With this suggestive slogan Christie expresses the wide-spread 
uneasiness about law’s ability to resolve conflicts: non-responsive, inhuman, irrational, (non-
em)pathetic...  
     The twelfth camel, in contrast, celebrates law’s expropriation. It transforms law’s original 
sin into its primary virtue. Indeed, by reconstructing a social conflict under highly artificial 
procedural conditions and with the help of a highly artificial language, the law expropriates, 
alienates,  displaces,  disseminates,  falsifies  the  original  conflict.  But,  witness  the  twelfth 
camel, this is the legal proprium. The law does not all develop sufficiently profound empathy 
to understand the original social conflicts out there; instead, it transforms them into technical 
legal  questions.  And  it  constructs  them  in  such  a  way  that  they  can  be  answered  by  its 
procedural and conceptual means. As a consequence, the quaestio juris  has very little or 
virtually nothing to do with the original social conflict (Galtung, 1965). The khadi’s camel is 
different from the sheikh’s camels. Legal cases do not - and are not supposed to -  map social 
conflicts. Law has not developed any adequate understanding of their causes, their meaning to 
the conflicting parties, their perspectives of acceptable solutions, their social consequences. 
As the debate over alternatives to the legal system has rightly shown, the law is by no means 
particularly suited for solving disputes among people satisfactorily to all concerned (Fitzpatrick, 
1992). Mediation, arbitration and settlement do much more justice to the nature of conflicts, 
their causes and the needs of the people at dispute.  Accordingly, one could in conflicts very 
well  do  without  the  law.  In  short,  law  falsifies  the  realities  of  the  conflict  and  produces 
decisions that are based on self-produced fictions.  
     The alienating effect is a historical variable, not a universal attribute of law. Many legal 
orders rely heavily on the communal character of their procedures and rules, reflecting the 
dominant religious and political orientation of their societies. Alienation by law is the result 
of a specific historical configuration. On the other hand it has not been institutionalised by 
intentional  planning  and  rational  design. There  was  no  political  decision  to  build  a legal 
machinery in order to alienate conflicts. The key to legal alienation is a phenomenon called 
re-entry  (Spencer  Brown,  1972:  56f.,  69ff.;  Luhmann,  1993a;  Luhmann,  1997:  179ff.; 
Esposito, 1993). The thesis of this article is that conflict alienation is the typical by-product of 
a double closure of law which in its turn is created by the re-entry of legal distinctions into 
themselves. 
     Court judgements, legislative acts, but also contracts and standardisation acts are decisions 
that are distinguished from other economic or political decisions by the fact that they transfer 
the symbol of legal validity from one normative proposition to another. Transfer of validity 
on the basis of the binary code legal/illegal takes place exclusively in recursive chains of 
court judgements, legislative and contractual acts. This is the (in)famous primary closure of 
law: operational closure by concatenation of legal acts (Teubner, 1993a: ch.2-4; Luhmann, 
1987; Luhmann, 1993b: ch. 2). The problematic aspect of this closure has, of course, been 
identified as empty tautologies, unproductive self-reference and insulation of law from its 
social environment. Critics of operational closure tend to look for social phenomena that 
break the boundaries of the law  and recommend communal justice (Cotterrell, 1995: ch. 5, 
15;  for  a  critique  of  operational  closure,  see  Kerchove  and  Ost,  1992).  However,  legal 
evolution has taken a different course. Operational closure has not been compensated through 
a return to close social embeddedness of the law’s underlying structures, but paradoxically, 
through  its  opposite:  through  duplicating  closure  (Foerster,  1981;  Luhmann,  200a:  ch.7). 
Closure of legal operations has become complemented by closure of legal self-observations. 
The crucial transformation took place when in court litigation, legislation and contracting 
legal argumentation began to exclude  arguments ad hoc and ad hominem and to refer to 
specialised legal  materials  (precedents, rules,  principles) in  a  very  specific  way.  It  is the 
exclusion of arguments which makes it possible that the legal process begins to insulate itself (more or less successfully) against social influences, especially clientelism, kinship, social 
status, friendship politics (Luhmann, 1993b: 263). ‘The artificial reason of law’ which Sir 
Coke invoked against the political interventions of the King makes it autonomous vis-a-vis 
the  immediate  validity  claims  of  moral  arguments,  economic  considerations,  political 
expediency and common sense.  
     Why should artificial reason compensate for primary closure? The reason is ‘re-entry’ of 
the extra-legal. While legal operations by virtue of their sequentialisation create the boundary 
between  law  and  non-law,  between  legal  communication  and  other  types  of  social 
communication, legal observations begin to use this very distinction legal/non-legal within 
the symbolic space of the law. This is, to be sure, different from the use of the binary code, 
legal  vs.  illegal,  which,  as  we  have  said,  makes  primary  closure  possible.  While  the 
distinction legal/illegal constituting the boundary between law and non-law is responsible for 
operational closure, the re-entry of the distinction law/non-law within the law is responsible 
for observational closure (Luhmann, 1993b: 67ff., 338ff.). This distinction opens an internal 
option for legal arguments: either they refer to internal legal operations or they refer
2 to 
external social operations. Now, in the second aspect lies the compensation for operational 
closure. Whenever the distinction legal/non-legal (in the sense of extra-legal) re-enters the 
sequence  of  legal  operations,  legal  argumentation  gains  the  capacity  of  distinguishing 
between norms and facts, between internal legal acts and external social acts, between legal 
concepts and social interests, between internal reality constructs of the legal process and those 
of social processes. This is the paradoxical achievement of double closure. While both, rule-
producing acts as well as rule-connecting arguments remain in their closed circuit of internal 
concatenations, legal self-observation by virtue of the internal distinction of self-reference and 
hetero-reference makes law dependent on its social environment (which is their “enacted” 
environment (Weick, 1979; on enaction as an alternative to representation, see Varela, 1992: 
235ff.), not their “real” one, to be sure). And the higher degrees of freedom that internal 
reconstruction of reality gains, in comparison with one-to-one relations of the external with 
the internal, increases the chances that re-entry compensates for primary closure. 
     Re-entry  has  drastic  consequences  (Spencer  Brown,  1972:  56f.,  69ff.).  When  the 
distinction  between  law  and  non-law  is  repeated  within  the  law,  it  creates  an  epistemic 
confusion  (à  la  Magritte:  ‘This  is  not  a  pipe’)  about  the  reality  status  of  law’s  hetero-
referential  observations. The  twelfth  camel  is  a  camel  is  a  camel,  not  different  from  the 
brothers’ eleven camels? Of course, it is a sheer fiction but the khadi needs to maintain the 
illusion that his camels are real. Result of the re-entry is the creation of an imaginary space 
within the law which takes itself for reality. The law cannot but create fictions about the 
outside world but has to treat them as hard-core realities. The twelfth camel lives only in the 
imaginary space of the law and still, the judge does lend it to the quarrelling brothers where it 
has astonishing effects. And here lies the reason why legal alienation of social conflicts is 
inevitable. 
     Conflict alienation is not just petty theft. To expropriate the parties of their conflict is 
poorly  understood  if  one  sees  it  exclusively  as  the  usurpation  of  the  social  by  legal 
professionals who use their specialised language as an instrument of power (Bourdieu, 1986). 
Alienating law helps the khadi’s camels to be prolific and multiply, more generally, legal 
alienation  increases  the  varieties  of  social  signification.  Estrangement    by  law  expands 
communal meaning by opening new, strange worlds. There is a striking parallel between art 
and law: both create a second reality, an imaginary world in which there are living more 
camels and different camels than in the real world of the desert. In this light, social science 
critiques of law look like Herr Beckmesser who scorns the great artist Hans Sachs for his lack 
of  realism.  They  miss  the  point  that  the  imaginary  worlds  of  art  and  law  make  things 
thinkable that could not have been thought before. This holds true for otherwise unthinkable 
artificial  constructs  within  the  world  of  legal  doctrine.  Reconstructing  a  conflict  in  the 
language  of  legal  doctrine,  raising  the  quaestio  juris,  factorising  it  into  a  sequence  of 
questions of fact and questions of law, allows for inventing new arguments, new criteria, new 
rules  which  would  not  be  possible  at  all  did  legal  doctrine  not  exist.  Moreover,  after 
prohibition of deni de justice, a legal decision to the conflict is guaranteed even if arguments ended in a deadlock. And under certain circumstances, when the twelfth camel is actually 
walking into the real world of the bedouin society, it may increase the possibilities for action 
there as well, which may or may not lead out of the paralysis of the social conflict. To be sure, 
there is no automatism. It is only under rare circumstances that legal alienation becomes more 
than legal theft. As a re-translation – from a social conflict into a legal issue and from there 
into a social event - it may, as a happy coincidence,  open up new possibilities of action in the 
social world. 
     If the camel symbolises  the legal proprium, what is it about? The khadi in the story is not 
helpful in the sense that he interprets the father’s will according to higher legal standards that 
should govern the conflict, nor does he decide according to principles of distributive justice 
which serve as a refinement of the current social practices of distribution. Instead, he lends 
them  a  fiction  –  and  this  is  the  key.  The  incongruence  fiction/reality  is  decisive.  When 
conflicts in the social world appear non-resolvable then their falsification by law shows its 
potential. It creates an additional, admittedly unrealistic, artificial, fictitious world out of the 
issues  at  stake.  Fictionalisation  makes  conflicts,  in  a  situation  of  their  moral  and  social 
undecidability, decidable, at least in the imaginary world of the law. 
     This turns the usual ideas about the social (in)adequacy of the law on their head. And it 
opens some different research questions and some different issues for the political agenda. 
The point is no longer for the law to be responsive to the self-understanding of the parties 
involved,  to  broader  social  norms,  moral  values,  community  standards  which  govern  the 
conflict situation. Just the opposite, the point is to reconstruct the conflict straightforward 
against common sense. Not assimilation of legal decisions to community standards but their 
alienation from them makes the surplus value of legal reconstruction visible. The critical 
situation is when conflicts have become socially, morally, politically and economically non-
resolvable and law reconstructs them in an artificial texture of topoi, concepts, constructions. 
Then they are almost no longer recognisable as social or moral conflicts, but as technical legal 
questions within an elaborate doctrine.  They become decidable only if one uses legal fictions 
that have no correspondence in the social worlds of the litigants. And the interesting question 
is then not whether these fictions “correspond” to the internal complexities of the conflict, but 
how they come about, into what directions they develop, and whether they have different 
latent selective affinities to the outside world. 
 
 
III. Legal argumentation 
 
     Does the contribution of the fictitious camel lie in the fact that it determines or at least 
justifies the legal decision of the brothers’ fight over the heritage of their father? Here we 
enter the perennial debate between determinacy or non-determinacy of legal argumentation, 
but ‘re-entry’ suggests a third position. Whenever legal operations via re-entry distinguish 
between the worlds of law and non-law it creates itself a non-resolvable indeterminacy within 
the law which cannot be resolved by its normal operations. This pushes the legal process 
toward differentiating internally two types of legal operations: legal decisions that convey the 
validity symbol and legal arguments that regulate the relation between redundancy and variety 
in law (Luhmann, 1995a). Two different chains of legal communication are resulting  - a 
sequence  of  legal  decisions  and  a  sequence  of  legal  arguments    -  which  are  closely 
interrelated but are not able to  determine each other. Legal decisions, due to their binding 
nature, regularly are transformed into new legal arguments but they do not determine the flow 
of legal reasoning. Legal arguments in their turn are elements of the legal decision, but they 
neither determine nor do they justify legal decisions. 
     This  goes  directly  against  theorists  of  rational  argumentation  in  law  who  rely  on  the 
intrinsic  force  of  rational  motivation.  They  make  themselves  blind  to  the  non-resolvable 
indeterminacy of law (Habermas, 1996: ch. 5; Günther, 1988: ch. 3, 4). But it goes as well 
against  decisionist and critical theorists of law (Schmitt, 1985; Schmitt, 1986; Kennedy, 
1997; Kelman, 1987). They suffer from a similar blindness. While they are right in stressing 
the unavoidable indeterminacy that cannot be reduced by any legal argument, they offer no adequate  understanding  of  what  then  legal  argumentation  is  about.  How  to  explain  the 
persistence  of  legal  argumentation  practices  after  realist  disenchantment,  decisionist 
demystification and critical trashing? Either they declare legal reasoning a masquerade which 
serves other purposes, preferably concealing power structures, or they reduce it to the trivial 
question of anticipating consensus among the legal elites. 
     The camel’s re-entry suggests that legal reasoning never decides a conflict, but achieves 
nevertheless something decisive. Legal argument is transforming differences, it transforms the 
original  decision  alternative  into  a  different  one.  Legal  reasoning  is  responsible  for  the 
alienation of the social conflict. Not more, not less. It does not determine, it does not justify, 
nor  does  it  hide something  else.  It  just  transforms  differences  but  does  so  drastically.  A 
decision remains necessary, before and after argumentation, but the concrete alternative that 
has to be decided will be totally different. It is the job of legal reasoning to lure lawyers into a 
situation  where  they  have  to  decide  a  question  which  differs  from  the  litigants’  original 
question. 
     Now, what difference does it make, when legal reasoning transforms a conflict between 
individual actors into a conflict of semantic artefacts of legal doctrine? Is this a reformulation 
of the time-honoured  problematic  relation  between  the  particular  case  which needs  to  be 
‘subsumed’  under  a  general  rule?  Are  we  looking  for  a  new  golden  rule,  categorical 
imperative or veil of ignorance? Legal autopoiesis suggests the transformation takes a course 
quite different from ethical generalisations. One part of the answer is, of course, to invoke 
law’s closure  and  self-reference.  It  is  the recursive  application  of  legal  operations  to  the 
results of legal operations that creates the artificial network of concepts, rules and principles. 
The more elaborate the network becomes over time, the more it moves legal reasoning away 
from an adequate appreciation of the particularities of the case. The never-ending practices of 
the equal or unequal treatment is the alienating mechanism. To treat what is equal equally and 
what is unequal unequally triggers off a self-propelling series of distinctions.  It is a generative 
mechanism,  a  ‘historical  machine’  as  von  Foerster  (1981)  would  call  it  which  relentlessly 
increases complexity in the world of legal fictions. Precedent, ‘stare decisis’, and treating the 
equal  equally  are  less  interesting  here.    Rather,  it  is  the  deviation  from  the  precedent,  the 
‘distinguishing’ and ‘overruling’, the unequal treatment of what is not equal, which provokes the 
search for more and more elaborate legal fictions.  
     But it is only half the alienation story to talk about internal self-reference applying past 
decisions and rules to new factual situations and producing new rules by this application. The 
other half of alienating justice is the permanent irritation by co-evolutionary contacts of the 
law  with  external  social  processes  that  redirects  the  changes  of  legal  semantics,  rules, 
concepts, principles, doctrines. The typical incongruence of legal rules and doctrines with the 
particular conflict is due to their co-variation with the change of distant social structures 
(Teubner, 1993a: ch. 4, 5; Luhmann, 1993b: ch. 12). 
     There  is,  of  course,  great  historical  variance  how  the  co-evolutionary  dynamics  is 
structured in itself. Today, legal and social institutions co-evolve no longer via spontaneous 
social  norms  and  customary  law,  but  typically  via  institutionalised  production  regimes. 
Production regimes are structural links between autonomous social systems – between law, 
economy, politics, education, research --  but they do not themselves evolve into autopoietic 
systems with their own elements, structures and boundaries. As forms of structural coupling 
(Maturana and Varela, 1988: ch. 5), production regimes are mere configurations of quite 
heterogeneous components, hybrids in the gap which exists between law and society. As 
such,  production  regimes  are  neither  functional  systems  nor  formal  organisations,  nor 
interactions in the technical sense of systems theory (Luhmann, 1982) but are merely linkage 
institutions between them (Teubner, 1992).  
     Production regimes have internal structures of their own that exert pressures on the way 
how legal rules co-variate with multiple social processes (Hall and Soskice, 1999; Soskice, 
1997; Teubner, 1998; Teubner, 2002). Contrary to a unified social evolution in which there is 
diffuse environmental pressure of various selectors on social institutions, here within one 
production regime several operationally closed systems participate which are each disposing 
of specific evolutionary mechanisms of their own. Each of them follows a different pattern of variation, selection and retention. Result is a multitude of autonomous evolutionary processes 
within one production regime which in their turn influence each other via mechanisms of co-
evolution. There is no unified trajectory of the production regime which would arise from the 
social environment by virtue of natural selection. Rather, a variety of diverging evolutionary 
dynamics  are  going  on  simultaneously  within  one  regime.  Independent  evolutionary 
mechanisms in the autopoietic systems of the law, economy, politics, science, education force 
their institutions within one production regime to take an idiosyncratic evolutionary path. And 
the production regime in its turn provides for specific channels of co-evolution which regulate 
how these evolutionary movements are influencing each other. Thus, legal doctrine cannot 
follow its own logic which would be dictated by a common-law-type history of accumulating 
particular conflicts. It is shaped by co-evolutionary forces within the production regime which 
direct law into a narrow space of compatibility with economic, political and other non-legal 
institutions. 
     Thus,  production  regimes  expose  the  closed  network  of  legal  operations  to  external 
irritations that take place in contexts very distant from the irritations of individual cases which 
are brought to the judge. This second source of external irritations creates an independent 
dynamics which drives the law into an inevitable incongruence of social conflicts and legal 
criteria for their resolution. For within production regimes, not only a process of gradual 
adaptation takes place where internally developed rules and doctrines are exposed to external 
constraints. But various independent machineries of social norm production intrude law’s empire 
from  the  periphery  by  transforming  social  norms  into  legal  rules.  With  the  help  of  these 
machineries,  heterogeneous  particularistic  rationalities  and  their  normative  claims  infiltrate 
massively the litigation-oriented law which has little control over the influx.  The most prolific 
extra-legal rule-making machines which are driven by the inner logics specialised social domains 
are installed in various formal organisations, informal networks, processes of standardisation and 
normalisation which are competing today with the legislative machinery and the contracting 
mechanism (Teubner, 1997a). The judicial process cannot reject these externally produced rules 
as alien to litigation. But what it does to these aliens is to ‘litigate them through’, to juridify them, 
to  convey  to  them  legal  validity,  to  re-interpret  them  in  terms  of  internal  consistency  with 
precedents, statutes and the political constitution, and – last not least - to draw from them criteria 
which are supposed to resolve the particular conflict. 
     Thus, conflict alienation has a double effect. It loosens the contact with the particular 
conflict situation of the litigants and intensifies contact with external production regimes. In a 
co-evolutionary process where an autonomous and self-referential legal doctrine develops via 
irritations from external institutions in various production regimes, the resulting normative 
structures - although, nay because they are necessarily ‘orthogonal’ to the original social 
conflict  –  are  acting  as  ‘neutral’,  ‘disinterested’,  ‘outside’  ‘third  parties’  to  judge  the 
individual conflict.  The twelfth camel was not born in order to resolve the fight between the 
brothers; the twelfth camel ‘as such’ is the product of an alien context, where arithmetical 
calculations allow the division of otherwise non-divisible numbers. Today, the hiatus between 
what the particular conflict would require as a satisfying resolution and what a production 
regime produces as legal rules in co-evolution with other institutions is impressive. What is 
the interest of litigants fighting for their money to have their case decided according to a new 
policy  twist  in  anti-trust law?  Why  should  the  criterion  of  allocative  efficiency  which  is 
applied  to  a  technical  question  of  tort  law  be  a  good  conflict  resolver  for  compensating 
somebody who suffered from a car accident? It is not the adequacy to the intricacies of their 
personal conflict situation, but, if anything, it is the incongruence of perspectives – litigation 
versus production regime -  which allows for deciding the undecidable. The only thing the 
litigating parties receive for sure is decidability. Forget the criteria. 
     And what do they pay in return?  The energies of the litigants who are desperately striving 
to win their individual cases are exploited by the argumentation machinery of law for other 
purposes. They are utilised to fuel the production of distant and abstract rules, concepts and 
principles which are oriented toward co-evolution in production regimes. By their litigation, 
the parties are sacrificing time, energy and devotion for the sake of creating future normative 
structures of distant production regimes. This is how the quarrelling brothers indeed fulfill Allah’s will ordering them to return the twelfth camel to the judge. And the khadi makes a 
good profit from the camel transaction. Alienating justice? There are good reasons to change 
the title of this article: Exploiting justice. 
 
 
IV. Production regimes 
 
     This  turns  our  perspective  around.  Exploiting  justice:  the  law  exploits  people' s 
quarrelsomeness  to  fuel  the  production  of  future  norms.  The  khadi,  in  his  wisdom  and 
generosity, knows how to exploit the brothers when they quarrel about father’s heritage. They 
have to feed the khadi’s camel with their conflict resources and have to return it to him well-
nourished, well-kept, well-trained, and in much better shape than it was before. Indeed, this is 
what court litigation does to multiple projections of legal rules which are made in diverse 
productions  regimes.  ‘Litigating  through’,  as  we  said  before,  exposes  the  rules  of  the 
production regimes to the particular conflict, but at the same time creates a considerable 
surplus value for the production regime itself. It transforms drastically the original meaning of 
proto-normative structures; it changes the status of diverse social rule projections in contracts, 
standards, competitive market processes, intra-organisational rules and, of course, legislative 
statutes. Court litigation is the via regis of law to make binding decisions about how to select 
among competing rule projections and to transfer legal validity to one of them; on this road 
the law  resolves collisions between divergent contractual obligations, different standards and 
legislative rules; it separates legal rules and principles from mere social norms, political goals, 
economic expectations that have no legal status; it clarifies ambivalences of meaning in one 
binding  interpretation  and  creates  new  controversies  of  interpretation  and  thus  fuels  the 
dynamics  of  legal  and  social  institutions  within  production  regimes.  It  is  through  court 
litigation and - one would have to add -  through anticipation of court litigation, too, that the 
production  regimes  enjoy  the  fruits  of  juridification:  a  considerable  difference  in  clarity, 
stability and external support of their expectations.  
     However, the price is alienation, incongruence of perspectives, now the other way around. 
Court  litigation  is  obstructing  the  good  intentions  of  production  regimes.  According  to 
evolutionary economics, a competitive market creates over time, after repeated transactions,  
transactional and organisational ‘routines’ which can be called efficient (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). However, when these routines are ‘tested’ in court litigation they become in their turn 
estranged    from  their  origins.  Exposed  to the  multiple  strategies  of  court  litigation,  their 
original market orientation will be contaminated by legal considerations of compensation, of 
distributive justice, of interest weighing, policy goals and particular aspects of the case at 
hand. Making them consistent with a multitude of legal topics ruins the economic purity of 
these routines. And re-litigation which is supposed to make law in the long run economically 
efficient  (Cooter  and Komhauser,  1980),  only  strengthens  the  deviation  from  the  path  of 
virtue in a positive feedback loop. Off goes efficiency. 
     Regulatory politics do not fare better. ‘Mon code est perdu!’ Napoléon broke into tears 
when he had found out that his famous code civil had undergone court litigation and had been 
changed  by  the  obscure  hermeneutics  of  shisters,  sophistic  advocates  and  judges. 
Contemporary regulatory politics, their definition of political goals, their choice of policy 
instruments,  among  them  legal  rules,  their  careful  strategies  of  implementation,  will  be 
necessarily  obstructed  when  they  have  to  go  through  the  litigious  interaction  of  clients, 
lawyers and judges. Strategies of policy-formation are replaced by the strategies of winning a 
legal  case.  Legal  rules  change  their  content  when  they  are  transformed  from  policy 
instruments into conflict tranquillisers. 
     Such obstruction of the original ‘institutional’ orientation of legal rules happens in all 
types of production regimes. Not only contracting and legislation, but also standardisation, 
normalisation, market competition, administrative decisions, intra-organisational rule making 
are  suffering  from  this  inverse  alienation.  Several  dynamics  can  be  identified  in  court 
litigation that are responsible for obstructing institutional justice: (1) Goal displacement: the 
original  orientation  -    facilitating  technical  processes,  efficiency  enhancing,  regulating behaviour, stabilising social institutions – is replaced by one overwhelming orientation: Who 
wins,  who  loses?  (2)  Time  horizon:  while  the  institutional  perspective  tends  to  stabilise 
expectations for future action, the litigation perspective is predominantly oriented toward the 
past. Reconstructing past events in the court room reduces complex normative structures to 
one question directrice: What was the ‘right’ expectation to govern the singular event? (3) 
Change  of  language:  While  social  rules  are  formulated  in  the  special  language  of  their 
institutional context, court litigation translates them into the special language of rights: What 
legal positions do they offer for the litigating parties? (4) Reality construction: While the 
reality of social rules is dictated by the cognitive mapping of the respective social institution, 
litigation forces these diverse realities into the two-party-perspective of the legal trial. 
     The improbability of the arrangement is impressive. Why should this double alienation, the 
forced unity of highly incongruent perspectives be a stable institutional configuration? Would 
one not expect that the forces of social differentiation move in and divorce this unhappy 
marriage among aliens? To be sure, specialised institutions for conflict resolution and rule 
production  have  indeed  developed  within  the  legal  system,  but  why  do  litigation  and 
production regimes nevertheless maintain their role as strange attractors to each other? And 
the forces of strange attraction are increasing in recent developments. International relations 
where conflict resolution and rule production had been institutionally separated for centuries 
have been undergoing a gradual process of juridification where increasingly court litigation 
and production regimes serve as mutual attractors (Higgins, 1997). Similar tendencies can be 
identified in international markets – witness the juridification of business contracting and 
international arbitration in the combination of lex mercatoria and the gradual transformation 
of  the  WTO-bureaucracy  into  court-like  structures  where  the  production  regimes 
simultaneously attract and obstruct conflict management and vice versa (Dezalay and Garth, 
1995; Teubner, 1997b).  
     I see two competing interpretations. One is Eigenvalues: Both, conflict resolution through 
normative expectations and rule-making in production regimes are recursive, self-referential 
processes  that  due  to  their  closure  in  circular  processes  do  not  find  sufficient  stable 
Eigenvalues so that they are desperately searching aliens to find points of stability. While 
social, economic, political processes do create proto-normative structures by their internal 
transactions  they  have  difficulties  in  stabilising  them.  These  volatile  structures  will  be 
undermined by the very processes that created them, by changes in power constellations, by 
new  market  structures,  by  new  social  situations.  However,  when  they  externalise  their 
products to the law and get them stabilised by the symbol of legal validity, they can avoid this 
incessant self-destruction. The other way around, a corresponding externalisation takes place 
in court litigation where the norm-creating dynamics of litigation in order to avoid their self-
obstruction refer to external ‘authorities’, to the legislator, to the contracting parties, to the 
market,  to  formal  organisations.  The  returns  for  alienation  consist  in  relatively  stable 
structures for production regimes and in decision criteria for court litigation.  
     The other interpretation is a ‘lock-in’ situation. Once the mutual attraction of litigation and 
production regimes is established, it develops a path-dependent evolutionary dynamics of its 
own which drives them deeper and deeper into their obstructive symbiosis and locks them 
there. Once production regimes are opened to the dynamics of court litigation, there is no 
chance  for  saving  spaces of  legal  immunity.  Any  rule  projection  bears  the  risk  of  being 
‘litigated through’ the courts. And once courts are borrowing their rules from external law-
making authorities, they cannot stop parties and their lawyers from drawing into the trial any 
normative  material  that  has  been  produced  by  the  officially  acknowledged  authoritative 
sources of law.  
     It is difficult to decide between the two interpretations, Eigenvalue and lock-in. Probably, 
both are true and there are ample opportunities for future empirical research to measure the 
relative weight of the two explanations. Even more can be expected from future institutional 
experimentation when it  tries to increase the ‘rationality’ of conflict resolution on the one 
hand and that of rule-making in production regimes on the other. This could suggest where to 
draw the line between Eigenvalue and lock-in. Knowing the line in its turn will decide about how realistic the chances are of making conflict resolution and rule making in production 
regimes more responsive to their respective context. 
 
 
V. Legal rationality 
 
     All this looks like another invisible hand mechanism which transforms strategic intentions 
into unintended social structures. But it has no benign effects. Does this kind of alienating 
justice create a ‘just and fair’ solution to the particular conflict? -  No, the conflict is resolved 
by reference to rules from the alien context of production regimes. Justice by incongruent 
perspectives, that is all. Does it produce ‘just and fair’ rules for the production regime?  - No, 
the invisible hand of co-evolution channels social norm projection through the filter of private 
litigation  so  that  the  dynamics  of  an  particular  conflict  decide  about  public  rules  for 
production regimes. Again, justice by incongruent perspectives. The whole story is basically a 
matter of blind co-evolution of litigation oriented legal semantics with institution oriented 
social structures.  Co-evolution does not guarantee – rather the opposite, it tends to obstruct  - 
social adequacy of legal concepts in relation to external social institutions. Is here, however, a 
chance for another re-entry? What if legal argumentation - conscious of its double role - 
develops systematically social knowledge about production regimes in order to increase the 
social adequacy of its rules?  
     A good example to discuss these issues might be constitutional rights and their horizontal 
effect in non-political contexts (Hunt, 1998; Graber and Teubner, 1998). Recent reports on 
media intrusion into private lives of people, on violations of public obligations in privatised 
services, on discriminatory practices in the corporate sector have shown, that constitutional law 
tends to neglect the crucial role of constitutional rights in the so-called private sphere. Is there 
something to be expected from a re-entry of social knowledge into legal doctrine? 
     Social theory, given its engagement with latent structures, claims to see more than legal 
doctrine does when individuals invoke their constitutional rights in court litigation. Quite 
apart from the overt effect on winning/losing the case, their latency has to do, sociologists 
submit, with stabilising social differentiation (Grimm, 1987; Willke, 1975; Luhmann, 1965). 
In  a  nutshell, the  argument  goes like  this.  Historically,  constitutional  rights as  individual 
entitlements come about with social differentiation. Their political and legal relevance is tied 
to  the  historical  emergence  of  individual  spheres  of  action  which  is  typical  for  modern 
societies. Social differentiation creates a variety of spheres of action, individual and non-
individual, the autonomy of which is mirrored in complementary constitutional rights. Social 
differentiation  and  the  emergence  of  constitutional  rights  are  complementary  historical 
processes. In the expansionist tendencies of the modern state, the historical process of social 
differentiation  threatens  to  undermine  itself.  In  long  lasting  political  fights,  constitutional 
rights  emerge  as  social  counter-institutions  protecting  social  differentiation  against  its 
inherent  self-destructive  tendencies.    Individual  conflicts  between  private  citizens  and 
administrative bureaucracies are transformed in legal institutional support of political self-
restraint. 
     What happens if such a latency is destroyed and parties, lawyers, and judges become 
conscious  of  it  and  legal  arguments  are  overtly  dealing  with  a  different  reality  of 
constitutional rights? Then a considerable gap between individual motivation and unintended 
results  comes  to  the  fore.  Why  should  individual  actors  litigate  for  the  sake  of  social 
differentiation? A predictable and recommendable reaction is then  to strengthen the link 
between  individual  motivation  for  litigation  and  social  effects  of  constitutional  rights.  A 
heavy particularistic component would have to be added to the  formal and general orientation 
in the conflict resolving rule. The judge would have to inject a strong dose of particularism 
into the rigid rules of the production regime. The recommendation to bridge the gap is: Create 
individual rights in the public interest and allow for class actions, associative action and other 
forms of public litigation.  
     Another reaction is to refine ‘social theories’ within constitutional law in order to render 
rules  more  adequate  to  the  production  regimes  involved  (Wielsch,  2000:  ch.  3).  The recommendation  is:  Import  Williamson  and/or  Luhmann  into  constitutional  argument. 
Economic institutionalism calls legal doctrine adequate to private governance regimes when it 
re-interprets particular conflicts as calculations of transaction cost minimization. This would 
be law’s contribution to constitutionalising private governance regimes (Williamson, 1996; 
Williamson, 1991). Systems theory would suggest something else: to reconstruct particular 
conflicts between actors in the private sphere as collisions of discourses (Teubner, 1997a; 
Teubner, 2000). The consequences for horizontal effects of constitutional rights would be that 
constitutional rights do not exclusively deal with economic power relations, but curb any media 
of communication which tend to colonize other sectors of social life. They can no longer be seen 
as protecting only the individual actor against the repressive power of the state, but would need to 
be  reconstructed  as  ‘discourse  rights’  against  expansive  tendencies  of  social  systems.  Its 
normative correlate would be an extension of constitutional rights into the context of private 
governance  regimes  (corporations,  media  organisations,  educational  institutions,  professional 
associations,  quangos,  international  organisations).  This,  however,  requires  a  fundamental 
transformation of the classical model of constitutional rights in all its four elements: individual - 
state - power - right. 
     These are two cases of law importing criteria from the social sciences – transaction cost 
minimisation / collision of discourses  - and applying them to individual cases. Clearly, again 
the  criteria  would  be  orthogonal  in  relation  to  the  particular  conflict.  But  would  the 
incongruence of perspectives not be compensated by a new adequacy of law: developing rules 
that are suited to efficient market structures or to polycontextural society? 
     Probably, such an illumination of law by social theory is over-optimistic. It underestimates 
problems of re-entry. ‘Social theories’ within the law  – with or without subsidies from the 
social sciences – are nothing but another form of re-entry of the law/non-law distinction into 
law, but on a different level of abstraction as compared to other re-entries - facts/rules, legal 
acts/social  acts,  concepts/interests.  Again  one  faces  the  inevitable  confusion  of  internal 
constructs with external reality. There is no way of testing the theories by directly accessing 
social reality. But also radical constructivism is no practical way out. If law took radical 
constructivism seriously and incorporated it into ongoing operations it would end in paralysis. 
Perhaps, what seems to be possible is a tentative and partial self-transparence of the legal re-
entry (Luhmann, 2000a: ch. 15). Law, without ever being sure about the adequacy of its 
reality constructs could experiment with various legal models of social reality. Wait for the 
result of legal decisions that have experimented with different reality constructs. Resistance of 
legal communication to legal communication is the only “reality test” possible.  
 
 
VI. Legal persons 
 
     ‘Should Camels Have Standing?’ Christopher Stone’s imaginative claim for trees’ rights to 
which recently Bruno Latour and Michel Serres have lent a certain sociological and philosophical 
credibility (Stone, 1972; Latour, 1993; Latour, 1998; Serres, 1990) offers a fascinating occasion 
where law experiments with its assumptions about social reality. Of course, it takes on a different 
meaning when translated into the language of autopoiesis. Are we moving into the new brave 
world of deep ecology: Mother Gaia autopoiesis as the new collective actor (Lovelock, 1979)? 
Or are we travelling back to the medieval times: ‘What Was It Like to Try a Rat’ (Ewald, 1995; 
Amira, 1891)? Can natural objects bring legal actions? Is law now exploiting nature itself for the 
sake of its relentless rule production? These questions change indeed the quantity and quality of 
legal subjectivity and the law' s relationships to the environment. At any rate, the ecological 
debate has again raised the question as to which ‘living’ units can rightly claim the status of legal 
actor.  
     Autopoiesis reformulates the problem. No longer: What kind of  ontological properties 
(mind, soul, reflexive capacities) does an entity possess in order to ‘be’ an actor, social legal 
or otherwise (Luhmann, 2000a: ch. 13)? Instead, two changes occur: Under what conditions 
does  the  environing  social  system,  i.e.  a  closed  and  autonomous  ensemble  of  recursive 
communications in which the entity appears, construct the semantic artefact of an ‘actor’? It is the surrounding social system – and not the entity itself – that constitutes identity, capacity for 
action and communication, responsibility, rights and duties, in short: creates the subjectivity 
of its fictions (Teubner, 1988; Luhmann, 1995b: 198ff.). It does so via attribution. A state 
becomes  a  collective  actor,  not  because  it  has  certain  natural  properties  or  a  specific 
organisational form. Rather it is the international system of war and peace that constructs its 
actors and thereby forces ethnic/territorial entities to take on the form of an institutionalised 
state if they want to participate in international politics (Luhmann, 1998). Similarly, it is the 
market that constructs firms, otherwise they are nothing but bundles of individual contracts 
(Teubner, 1993b). 
     Nomen  ossibus  inhaeret  -  once  the  legal  system  has  abandoned  that  old  prejudice  and 
equipped ‘spiritual substances’ too with nomina by giving them rights of action, then the law can 
link up to entirely different conflictual dynamics which enhance its production of norms. The 
invention of the legal person was law’s great cultural contribution to the organisational revolution 
in which attribution of action was expanded from natural people to communicative processes. 
With the bold idea to attribute legal personality not only to individuals but to mere flows of 
communications, the law cloned another camel, lent it to society and profited itself greatly from 
the transaction when society returned the beast. Formal organisations as collective actors are the 
case in point.  Once they were made into legal persons by giving them the right to sue and to be 
sued, the production of law could exploit the enormous conflict potential of formally organised 
action for its own rule production, which puts individuals'  comparable potential well in the shade 
(Teubner  and  Hutter,  2000).  ‘Why  the  Haves  Come  Out  Ahead’  -  under  this  slogan,  legal 
sociologists have closely studied the great difference in conflict potential between organisations 
and individuals before the courts (Galanter, 1974; Röhl 1987). But this is only a side-aspect. 
Certainly, collective actors as a rule have different and frequently better chances of winning; 
what would be needed instead would be careful empirical study of what the role of organisations 
to trials means for legal rule production itself in the co-evolution of legal semantics and social 
structures. 
     Only human individuals can be actors - this conviction has received a new blow by the 
ecological movement. But how to identify actors in the new political ecology? Environment 
protection groups are still the easiest cases of ‘new’ actors.  Future generations?  Animal species?  
Plants?  Landscapes?  And what about languages? Cultures?  The question is whether these new 
actors in the ecological discourse fighting for their interests and rights are just social movements 
in the broadest sense who ask for formal recognition as legal actors?  Or is the law here linking 
up with other ‘living’ processes which would steer its rule production into new directions? 
     Indeed, the latter would be a consequence of legal autopoiesis. Niklas Luhmann - as well as 
Bruno  Latour  and  Michel  Serres  -  make  us  see  ecological  camels.  Does  this  mean  that 
subjectivity – whether human people, formal organisations, political states or other actors -  is 
simply reduced to their status of legal fictions, communicative artefacts? No, social systems are 
highly selective in their attribution. They attribute only under one condition: That the soul returns 
into society. Not really, of course, but again in the ambivalent form of a re-entry, in a double re-
entry to be precise. Social systems, before they convey subjectivity to objects – human beings, 
collectives, spiritual entities, animals, computers -  request credible indicators for addressability 
(Fuchs, 1991; Fuchs, 1997). They attribute subjectivity only under the condition that they have 
good reasons to presuppose self-referential processes of meaning behind their social addresses 
and at the same time they request close structural coupling with their communication. Social 
systems attribute subjectivity only if (1) they presuppose the operation called Verstehen behind 
their communicative artefacts, (2) they presuppose that these artefacts presuppose the same in 
their partners and (3) the attributing social system itself has developed an internal irritability 
toward the contributions of those ‘subjects’. In their operational closure, social systems do not 
have access to this self-referential reality of the Other, but they need to be prepared in their 
internal structures. Not unlike Thomas, they have to be irritated before they believe in the Other’s 
existence. The proof of the pudding is in the irritating. 
     Formal organisations, for example, become collective actors only when the surrounding social 
system has good reasons to believe in their invisible self-reference, i.e. a closed self-referential 
signification process, roles and procedures for collective representation,  and when it actually “feels” irritated by the dynamics of organisational processes. Ethnic entities are recognised as 
states only when international law is sufficiently irritated by ‘overwhelming’ evidence that the 
famous  three  conditions  of  statehood  -  territory,  population,  actual  power  structures  -  are 
fulfilled. And Latour’s ecological actants? Indeed, Latour observes rightly that the historical 
contribution  of  the  ecological  movement  is  constructing  the  ‘septième  cité’.  Extending 
Boltanski’s and Thevenot’s  mapping  of  six  closed  and  mutually  incompatible  discourses of 
justification (Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991), Latour asserts that the new discourse of political 
ecology has the potential to develop into a full-fledged new social system, into the ‘green city’ 
inhabited by the species of ecological actants. 
   
Political ecology ... bears on complicated forms of associations between beings: regulations, 
equipment, consumers, institutions, habits, calves, cows, pigs ...a collective experimentation 
on the possible associations between things and people .... a network of quasi-objects whose 
relations of subordination remain uncertain and which thus require a new form of political 
acitivity adapted to following them (Latour, 1998: 229, 234-5). 
  
However, in the ‘parliament of things’ only some of Latour’s actants, not all of them, have 
chances of social and legal recognition. Indeed, Latour stresses with good reasons, it is the 
attribution of autonomy to processes that decides about the actor status. But against Latour 
(Latour, 1993), we are, we have been and we remain modern and cannot be otherwise. Angels, 
temples, gods, oracles that once upon a time had been real subjects of social communication will 
not be social actors any more, not because they do not exist - who knows - but because modern 
social systems have lost their irritability toward them. For them the world is no longer populated 
with  
 
non-human addresses, with communicative chances which refer to ancestors’ spirits, gods, 
trees, holy shrines, ‘intestines, birds’ flight, to all those visible and non-visible phenomena to 
which  dealing  with  their  own  self-reference  could  be  presupposed  (which  includes  the 
potential to deceive, to lie, to trickster, and to express something by silence) (Fuchs, 1996: 
120f.) 
 
But  ecological  entities,  socio-technical  artefacts,  cyborgs,  hybrids,  networks  and  other 
information processing Latourian actants have a real chance of irritating modern society and thus 
participating in the political ecology. 
     And the judge’s camel? There are signs that the law is beginning to re-engineer its procedural 
and conceptual machines for producing the new fictitious inhabitants of the seventh cité. The 
inclusion of ecological rights in political constitutions, the gradual juridification of animal rights, 
the  change  in  legal  language  from  the  semantics  of  ‘protection  of  nature’  via  ‘ecological 
interests’ to ‘rights’ of living processes, the slow process of granting standing to ecological 
associations, the expanding conceptualisation of ecological damages are indicators that the law is 
preparing again to lend a new breed of camels to society (Ogorek, 1999; Godt, 1997; Schmidt, 
1996;  Pfordten,  1995;  Erbel,  1986).  ‘Actants’  and  ‘mediators’  in  the  emerging  ecological 
discourse need not to dispose of full-fledged legal subjectivity in order to open new political 
dynamics.  Multiple  legal  distinctions    -  distinctions  between  different  graduations  of  legal 
subjectivity, between mere interests, partial rights and full fledged rights, between limited and 
full capacity for action, between agency, representation, trust, between individual, several, group, 
corporate and other forms of collective responsibility -  have the potential to confer a carefully 
delimited legal status to associations of ecological actants. And those real fictions may do their 
work as actants exclusively in the ecological discourse without necessarily appearing as actors 
everywhere in society. Legal capacity of action can be selectively attributed in different social 
contexts. It looks as if the chances were good that the judges’ camels will be prolific and will 
indeed multiply. 
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1 For further reflections on this theme, see the contributions in the special issues on Niklas Luhmann, Zeitschrift 
für Rechtssoziologie 2000 and Droit et Société 2000. 
 
2 Literally: refer to them as internal constructs, not: reach out, participate, constitute etc them. 